Abstract. We introduce the notion of rate-limited secure function evaluation (RL-SFE). Loosely speaking, in an RL-SFE protocol participants can monitor and limit the number of distinct inputs (i.e., rate) used by their counterparts in multiple executions of an SFE, in a private and verifiable manner. The need for RL-SFE naturally arises in a variety of scenarios: e.g., it enables service providers to "meter" their customers' usage without compromising their privacy, or can be used to prevent oracle attacks against SFE constructions.
Introduction
Secure function evaluation (SFE) allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to securely compute a function f of their private inputs. Roughly speaking, SFE protocols guarantee that the function is computed correctly and that the parties will not learn any information from the interaction other than their output and what is inherently leaked from it. Seminal results in SFE show that one can securely compute any functionality [53, 54, 25, 2, 13] . There has been a large number of follow-up work improving the security, strengthening adversarial models, and studying efficiency. Recent work on practical SFE has also led to real-world deployments [7, 6] , and the design and implementation of several SFE frameworks [44, 5, 17, 36, 38] .
In practice, most applications of SFE considered in the literature need to accommodate multiple executions of a protocol. 1 Consider a client that searches for multiple patterns in a large text via a secure pattern matching protocol [32, 34] , searches several keywords in a private database via an oblivious keyword search [48, 20] , or an individual who needs to run a software diagnostic program, or an intrusion detection system (IDS) to analyze data via an oblivious branching program (OBP) or an automaton evaluation (OAE) protocol [39, 52] .
Invoking an SFE protocol multiple times raises important practical issues that are outside the scope of standard SFE, and hence are not addressed by the existing solutions. We point out two such issues and introduce rate-limited SFE as a means to address them. The reason for the choice of name is that rate-limiting is commonly used in network and web applications to refer to restrictions put on clients' usage (on a per user, or a per IP address basis). In this work we consider similar restrictions on a user's inputs to services that maybe implemented using SFE.
Secure Metering of SFE. Service providers tend to charge their clients according to their level of usage: a location-based service may wish to charge its clients based on the number of locations they use the service from; a database owner based on the number of distinct search queries; an IDS provider based on the number of suspicious files sent for vulnerability analysis. Service providers would be more willing to adopt SFE protocols if it is possible to efficiently enforce such a metering mechanism. The challenge is to do so without compromising the client's privacy, or allowing the server or the client to cheat the metering system.
Oracle attacks. Consider multiple executions of a two-party SFE protocol (such as those mentioned above), where the first party's input stays the same in different executions but the second party's input varies. A malicious second party who "adaptively" uses different inputs in each execution, can gradually learn significant information about the first party's input, and, in the worst case, fully recover it. For instance, consider an oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocol (e.g., used in oblivious keyword search) wherein the server holds a polynomial p while the client holds a private point x and wants to learn p(x), but cannot learn more than it. Evaluating the polynomial p on sufficiently many points allows a malicious client to interpolate and recover p. A similar attack can be applied to OBP and OAE protocols to learn the private branching program or automaton which may embed propriety information. Learning attacks of this sort are wellunderstood and have been previously identified as important threats in the context of SFE; they are sometimes referred to as oracle attacks since the attacker has black-box access to input/output values from multiple executions (e.g., see the discussion in [1] ).
A naïve solution to the problems discussed above is to limit the total number of executions of an SFE protocol, ignoring the actual input values. However, this approach does not provide a satisfactory solution in most scenarios. For example, in case of secure metering, fixing an a priori upper bound on the total number of executions would mean charging legitimate clients multiple times for using the service with the same input; a disadvantage for clients who may need to use the same input from multiple devices, or reproduce a result due to communication errors, device upgrades, or perhaps to prove the validity of the outcome to a third-party by re-running the protocol. Similarly, in case of oracle attacks, clients need not be disallowed to use the same input multiple times since querying the same input many times does not yield new information to an attacker.
Rate-limited SFE. A more accurate (and challenging) solution is to limit and/or monitor the number of distinct inputs used by an SFE participant in multiple executions. Obviously, this should be done in a secure and efficient manner, i.e., a party should not be able to exceed an agreed-upon limit, and its counterpart should not learn any additional information about his private inputs, or impose a lower limit than the one they agreed on. 2 We refer to the number of distinct inputs used by a participant as his rate, and call a SFE protocol that monitors/limits this number, a rate-limited SFE.
Of course, achieving RL-SFE is more costly than the naïve solution discussed above. However, at a minimum we require the proposed solution to avoid storing and/or processing the complete transcripts of all previous executions. (We discuss the exact overhead of our solutions in detail below. ) We note that the complementary question of what functions are unsafe for use in SFE (leak too much information) has also been studied, e.g., by combining SFE and differential privacy [3, 46] , or belief tracking techniques [45] . These works are orthogonal to ours, and can potentially be used in conjunction with rate-limited SFE as an enforcement mechanism. For instance, the former works can be invoked to negotiate on a function f with a measurable "safeness" from which the rate for each user can be derived. Subsequently, the abidance of this rate can be enforced through our rate-limited SFE.
Our Contribution
Motivated by the discussion above, we initiate the study of rate-limited SFE. For simplicity, in this paper we focus on the two-party case, but point out that the definitions and some of the constructions are easily extendible to the multiparty setting. Our main contributions are as follows.
Definitions. We introduce three definitions for rate-limited secure function evaluation: (i) ratehiding, (ii) rate-revealing and (iii) pattern-revealing. All our definitions are in the real-world/idealworld simulation paradigm and are concerned with multiple sequential executions of an SFE protocol. They reduce to the standard simulation-based definition (stand alone) for SFE, when applied to a single execution.
In a rate-hiding RL-SFE, in each execution, the only information revealed to the parties is whether the agreed-upon rate limit has been exceeded or not. In a rate-revealing RL-SFE, the parties additionally learn the current rate (i.e., the number of distinct inputs used by their counterpart so far). In a pattern-revealing RL-SFE, parties also learn the pattern of occurrences of each other's inputs during the previous executions. These notions provide a useful spectrum of tradeoffs between security and efficiency: our constructions become more efficient as we move to the more relaxed notions, to the extent that our pattern-revealing transformation essentially adds no overhead to the underlying SFE protocol.
Commit-first SFE. In order to design rate-limited SFE protocols, we formalize the auxiliary notion of commit-first SFE (cf-SFE). Roughly speaking, a protocol is commit-first if it can be naturally divided into a (i) committing phase, where each party becomes committed to its input for the second phase, and (ii) a function evaluation phase, where the function f is computed on the inputs committed to in the first phase. 3 We utilize cf-SFE as a stepping stone to design rate-limited SFE. It turns out that the separation between the input commitment phase and the function evaluation phase facilitates the design of efficient rate-limited SFE. In particular, now a party only needs to provide some evidence of a particular relation between the committed inputs in the first phase. In contrast, if we had not started with a commit-first protocol, such an argument would have involved the complete history of the transcripts for all the previous executions, rendering such an approach impractical.
The related notion of "evaluating on committed inputs" is well-known (e.g. see [25, 40] ), but we need and put forth a formal (and general) definition for cf-SFE in order to prove our RL-SFE protocols secure. We then show that several existing SFE constructions are either commit-first or can be efficiently transformed into one. Examples include variants of Yao's garbled circuit protocol, the oblivious polynomial evaluation of Hazay and Lindell [35] , the private set intersection protocol of Hazay and Nissim [33] , and oblivious automaton evaluation of Gennaro et al. [24] . We also show that the GMW compiler [29] , outputs a commit-first protocol. This is of theoretical interest as it provides a general compiler for transforming a semi-honest SFE protocol into a malicious cf-SFE (and eventually a rate-limited SFE using the compilers in this paper). We elaborate on these cf-SFE instantiations in Appendix A.1.
Compilers & Techniques. We design three compilers for transforming a cf-SFE into each of the three variants of RL-SFE discussed above, and provide simulation-based proofs of their security. All our compilers start from a cf-SFE protocol and add a "proof of repeated-input phase" between the committing phase and the function evaluation phase. An exception is our pattern-revealing compiler, where a proof of repeated-input is implicit given that we force the commitments to be deterministic. In our first compiler (rate-hiding), whenever the j-th execution begins, party P 1 first checks whether its input is "fresh" or has already been used in a previous run. In the former case, P 1 encrypts the value "1" and, otherwise, the value "0" using a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme (E, D) for which it holds the secret key sk. Denote the resulting ciphertext with c j . Party P 1 forwards to P 2 a ZK proof of the following statement:
("committed to old input" ∧ "encryption of 0")
Intuitively, the proof above only leaks the fact that the rate is not exceeded in the current execution, but nothing else. In order to generate this proof (resp. verify the proof generated by the counterpart), P 1 needs to store all the commitments and ciphertexts sent to (resp. received from) P 2 in previous executions.
For our second compiler (rate-revealing), we can do without the encryptions. Parties can instead prove a simpler statement giving evidence that the current (committed) input corresponds to one of the commitments the other party received earlier. Clearly, this approach reveals the current rate, but as we prove nothing more.
Finally, our third compiler (pattern-revealing) exploits a PRF to generate the randomness used in the committing phase of the underlying cf-SFE protocol. In this way, the commitment becomes deterministic (given the input), allowing the other party to check whether the current input has already been used and in which runs. This approach discloses the pattern of inputs used by the parties; on the other hand, it is extremely efficient adding little computational overhead (merely one invocation of a PRF) to the original cf-SFE protocol.
Making RL-SFE stateless. The above compilers suffer from the limitation that the parties need to keep a state which grows linearly in the total number of executions of the underlying SFE protocol. In many applications, clients do not keep state (and outsource this task to the servers), either due to lack of resources or because they need to use the service from multiple locations/devices. We show a general approach for transforming the stateful RL-SFE protocols generated above into stateless ones. Here, the client keeps only a small secret (whose size is independent of the total number of executions), but is still able to prevent cheating by a malicious server, and preserve privacy of his inputs. At a high level, the transformation requires the client to store its authenticated (MACed) state information on the server side and retrieve/verify/update it on-the-fly as needed. We show how to apply this transformation to our rate-revealing compiler to obtain a stateless variant and prove its security. A similar technique can be applied to our rate-hiding compiler. Our pattern-revealing compiler is already stateless (client only needs to store a PRF key) for the party who plays the role of the client.
Case Study. We take a closer look at the oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol of Hazay and Lindell [35] . Their protocol is secure against malicious adversaries. We show that it is also a commit-first OPE, by observing that a homomorphic encryption of the parties' inputs together with ZK proofs of their validity, can be interpreted as a commitment to their inputs. This immediately yields an efficient pattern-revealing RL-SFE for the OPE problem, based on the compiler we design. We also provide an efficient rate-hiding and rate-revealing RL-OPE by instantiating the ZK proofs for membership in the necessary languages, efficiently.
Roadmap
We discuss some preliminaries in Section 2 and give our model for commit-first SFE in Section 3. The definition of rate-limited SFE is introduced in Section 4. Our rate-hiding, rate-revealing and pattern-revealing compilers are described and analyzed in Section 5, whereas Section 6 describes the stateless version of the rate-revealing compiler. Finally, Section 7 deals with concrete instantiations for the case of OPE.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout the paper, we denote the security parameter by λ. A function negl (λ) is negligible in λ (or just negligible) if it decreases faster than the inverse of every polynomial in λ. A machine is said to run in polynomial-time if its number of steps is polynomial in the security parameter.
Let X = {X λ } λ∈N and Y = {Y λ } λ∈N be two distribution ensembles. We say X and Y are computationally indistinguishable (and we write X ≡ c Y ) if for every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A there exists a negligible function negl such that
Note that all our security statements can be straightforwardly proven for uniform polynomial-time adversaries, as well.
If x is a string, |x| denotes the length of x. Vectors are denoted boldface; given vector x, we write x[j] for the j-th element of x. If X is a set, #X represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x ← X . When A is an algorithm, y ← A(x) denotes a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and random coins r.
Our compilers make use of standard cryptographic primitives. We define these primitives in Appendix A.
Commit-First Secure Function Evaluation
In this section, we formally define the notion of commit-first secure function evaluation (cf-SFE). Our three compilers Ψ RH , Ψ RR and Ψ PR for designing rate-limited SFE, leverage commit-first protocols as a building block. We call a protocol π commit-first if it can be naturally divided into two phases. In the first phase (committing phase), both parties P 1 and P 2 become committed to their inputs. At the end of this phase, no information about the parties' inputs is revealed (the hiding property), and neither party can use a different input than what it is committed to in the remainder of the protocol (the binding property). In the second phase (function evaluation phase), the function f will be computed on the inputs committed to in the last phase.
We now describe the two separate phases more precisely. Consider a polynomial-time functionality f = (f 1 , f 2 ) with f i : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . Then, a cf-SFE protocol π = (π 1 , π 2 ) for evaluating f on parties' inputs x 1 and x 2 proceeds as follows.
Committing Phase: Parties P 1 and P 2 execute π 1 which is defined by the functionality ((x 1 , r 1 ), (x 2 , r 2 )) → (C 2 (x 2 , r 2 ), C 1 (x 1 , r 1 )). Note that the commitment schemes C 1 , C 2 can be arbitrary schemes (often different for each cf-SFE protocol), as long as they satisfy the hiding and the binding properties required.
Function Evaluation Phase: Afterwards, P 1 and P 2 execute π 2 on the same inputs as in the committing phase; π 2 is defined by the functionality (( x 2 ) ). Note that P 1 and P 2 , can use their state information from the previous phase in the function evaluation phase, too.
Next, we formalize the security definition for a cf-SFE using the real/ideal world simulation paradigm.
The real world. In each execution, a non-uniform adversary A following an arbitrary polynomialtime strategy can send messages in place of the corrupted parties (whereas the honest parties continue to follow π). Let i ∈ {1, 2} be the index of the corrupted party. A real execution of π = (π 1 , π 2 ) on inputs (x 1 , x 2 ), auxiliary input z to A and the security parameter λ, denoted by real
is defined as the output of the honest party and the adversary upon execution of π.
The ideal world. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be the index of the corrupted party. We define the ideal world in two steps. During the ideal execution, the honest party sends its input x 3−i , and a uniformly random string r 3−i used by the commitment scheme, to the trusted party. Party P i which is controlled by the ideal adversary S, called the simulator, may either abort (sending a special symbol ⊥) or send input x i , and an arbitrary randomness r i (not necessarily uniform) chosen based on the auxiliary input z, and P i 's original input x i . Denote by ((x 1 , r 1 ), (x 2 , r 2 )) the values received by the trusted party. If the trusted party receives ⊥, the value ⊥ is forwarded to both P 1 and P 2 and the ideal execution terminates; else the trusted party computes γ 1 = C 1 (x 1 ; r 1 ) and γ 2 = C 2 (x 2 ; r 2 ), respectively. The TTP sends γ 3−i to S, which can either continue or abort by sending ⊥ to the TTP. In case of an abort, the TTP sends ⊥ to the honest party; otherwise, it sends γ i .
In the second phase, the honest party continues the ideal execution by sending to the TTP a continue flag, or abort by sending ⊥. S sends either ⊥ or continue based on the auxiliary input z, P i 's original input, and the value γ 3−i . If the trusted party receives ⊥, the value ⊥ is forwarded to both P 1 and P 2 and the ideal execution terminates; else the trusted party computes
The TTP sends y i to S. At this point, S can decide whether the trusted party should continue, and thus send the output y 3−i to the honest party, or halt, in which case the honest party receives ⊥. The honest party outputs the received value. The simulator S outputs an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function of (z, x i , y i ).
The ideal execution of f on inputs (x 1 , x 2 ), auxiliary input z to S and security parameter λ, denoted by ideal
is defined as the output of the honest party and the simulator.
Emulating the ideal world. We define a secure commit-first protocol π as follows:
Def inition 3.1 (Commit-first Protocols) Let π and f be as above. We say that π is a commitfirst protocol for computing f = (f 1 , f 2 ) in the presence of malicious adversaries with abort if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real world there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S in the ideal world, such that for every i ∈ {1, 2},
where x 1 , x 2 , z ∈ {0, 1} * and λ ∈ N.
Rate-Limited Secure Function Evaluation
In this section, we introduce three notions for rate-limited secure function evaluation (RL-SFE). In particular, we augment the standard notion of two-party SFE by allowing each player to monitor and/or limit, the number of distinct inputs (the rate) the other player uses in multiple executions. The idea is that each party can abort the protocol if the number of distinct inputs used in the previous executions raises above a threshold ¦r1 ∈ N. We call this threshold the rate limit, i.e. the maximum number of allowable executions with distinct inputs. Naturally, our security definitions for RL-SFE are concerned with multiple executions of an SFE protocol and reduce to the standard simulation-based definition (stand alone) for SFE, when applied to a single run. We call a sequence of executions of a protocol π (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited if party P 1 (resp. P 2 ) can use at most ¦r1 1 (resp. ¦r1 2 ) distinct inputs in the executions. In this work, we assume that the executions take place sequentially, i.e. one execution after the other. We emphasize that the inputs used by the parties in each execution can depend on the transcripts of the previous executions, but honest parties will always use fresh randomness in their computation.
We provide three security definitions for rate-limited SFE: (i) rate-hiding, (ii) rate-revealing and (iii) pattern-revealing. In a rate-hiding RL-SFE, at the end of each execution, the only information revealed to the parties (besides the output from the function being computed), is whether the agreed-upon rate limit (threshold) has been exceeded or not, but nothing else. In a rate-revealing RL-SFE, in addition to the above, parties also learn the current rates (i.e., the number of distinct inputs used by their counterpart so far). Finally, in a pattern-revealing RL-SFE, parties further learn the pattern of occurrences of each others' inputs in the previous executions. In particular, each party learns which executions were invoked by the same input and which ones used different ones, but nothing else.
High Level Description. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a pair of polynomial-time functions such that f i is of type f i : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . Consider an arbitrary number of sequential executions of two-party SFE protocol π for evaluating f on parties' inputs. During the j-th execution, party P i has input x j i and should learn y
). We will define rate-limited SFE in the general case where both parties are allowed to change their input in each execution. The case of oracle attacks and secure metering, where one party's input is fixed and the other party's input changes, are found as a special case. (In the case of secure metering one can also think that a change in the service provider's input reflects a software update.)
In the ideal world, during the j-th execution, each party sends its input to a trusted authority. The following is then performed for both i = 1, 2. The trusted party checks whether value x j i was already sent in a previous execution; in case it was not, a new entry (x j i , j) is stored in an initially empty set X i . Otherwise, the index j < j corresponding to such input is recovered. Whenever #X i exceeds ¦r1 i the trusted party aborts. Otherwise, the current outputs y
Finally: (i) in the rate-hiding definition party P i learns only y j i ; (ii) in the rate-revealing definition party P i learns also #X 3−i , i.e. the (partial) total number of distinct inputs used by P 3−i until the jth execution; (iii) in the pattern-revealing definition party P i learns j , i.e. the index corresponding to the query where x j i was asked for the first time. Note that if the rate is exceeded, the trusted party aborts here, but, equivalently, we could simply ignore this execution and still allow to query previous inputs in subsequent executions.
We formalize the above intuitive security notions for all three flavors using the simulation-based ideal/real world paradigm. We first review the real execution which all three notions share.
The real world. In each execution, a non-uniform adversary A following an arbitrary polynomialtime strategy can send messages in place of the corrupted party (whereas the honest party continues to follow π). Let i ∈ {1, 2} be the index of the corrupted party. The j-th real execution of π on inputs (x j 1 , x j 2 ), auxiliary input z j to A and security parameter λ, denoted by real ¦r1
is defined as the output of the honest party and the adversary in the j-th real execution of π. We denote by real ¦r1 π,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ, ) the accumulative distribution at the end of the -th execution, i.e., real
. . , x 2 ) and z = (z 1 , . . . , z ). The ideal world. The trusted party keeps two sets X 1 , and X 2 initially set to ∅. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be the index of the corrupted party. During the j-th ideal execution, the honest party sends its input to the trusted party. Party P i , which is controlled by the ideal adversary S, called the simulator, may either abort (sending a special symbol ⊥) or send input x j i to the trusted party chosen based on the auxiliary input z j , P i 's original input x If the trusted party receives ⊥, the value ⊥ is forwarded to both P 1 and P 2 and the ideal execution terminates; else when the trusted party receives x j 1 as the first party's input, it checks whether an entry (x j 1 , j ) ∈ X 1 already exists; if so, it sets J 1 = j . Otherwise, it creates a new entry (x j 1 , j), adds it to X 1 , and sets J 1 = j. An identical procedure is applied to input of the second party x j 2 to determine an index J 2 . At the end of the j-th ideal execution if σ 1 := #X 1 ≥ ¦r1 1 or σ 2 := #X 2 > ¦r1 2 , the value ⊥ is forwarded to both P 1 and P 2 and the ideal execution terminates. Otherwise, the pair (y
At this point, the ideal executions will be different depending on the variant of RL-SFE being considered.
Rate-Hiding. The trusted party forwards to the malicious party P i the output y j i . At this point, S can decide whether the trusted party should continue, and thus send the pair y 3−i to the honest party, or halt, in which case the honest party receives ⊥.
Rate-Revealing. The trusted party forwards to the malicious party P i the pair (y 2 ), auxiliary input z j to S and security parameter λ, denoted by ideal
, λ) j is defined as the output of the honest party and the simulator in the above j-th ideal execution. Here, X ∈ {RH, RR, PR} determines the flavor of rate-limited SFE. We denote by ideal ¦r1−X f,S(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ, ) the accumulative distribution at the end of the -th execution, i.e.,
where
. . , x 2 ) and z = (z 1 , . . . , z ). Emulating the ideal world. Roughly speaking, sequential executions of a protocol π are secure under the rate limit ¦r1 = (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 ) if the real executions can be simulated in the above mentioned ideal world. More formally, we define a secure (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol π as follows:
Def inition 4.1 (RL-SFE) Let π and f be as above, and consider = poly(λ) sequential executions of protocol π. For X ∈ {RH, RR, PR}, we say protocol π is a secure X ¦r1-limited SFE for computing f = (f 1 , f 2 ), in presence of malicious adversaries with abort with ¦r1 = (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 ), if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S, such that for every i ∈ {1, 2},
It is easy to see that the rate-hiding notion is strictly stronger than the rate-revealing notion, which in turn is strictly stronger than the pattern-revealing notion. A proof to this fact can be found in Appendix B.
Compilers for Rate-Limited SFE
In this section, we introduce our three compilers to transform an arbitrary (two-party) cf-SFE protocol into a rate-limited protocol for the same functionality.
Our first compiler Ψ RH achieves the notion of rate-hiding RL-SFE through the use of general ZK proofs and (additively) homomorphic public key encryption. Our second compiler Ψ RR achieves the notion of rate-revealing RL-SFE and is more efficient in that it needs to prove a simpler statement and does not rely on homomorphic encryption. Our last compiler Ψ PR introduces essentially no overhead and avoids the use of general ZK proofs, yielding our third notion of pattern-revealing RL-SFE.
Let π f be a two-party (single-run) commit-first protocol for secure function evaluation of a function f = (f 1 , f 2 ) (cf. Definition 3.1). Our compilers get as input (a description of) π f , together with the rate ¦r1 = (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 ), and the number of executions , and output (a description of) π f ← Ψ(π f , ¦r1, ). The compilers are functionality preserving, meaning that protocol π repeatedly computes the same functionality f .
A Rate-Hiding Compiler
The Overview. We naturally divide the cf-SFE protocol into a committing phase and a function evaluation phase and introduce a new phase in between where P 1 and P 2 convince each other that they have not exceeded the rate limit. The latter step is achieved as follows. Whenever one of the parties is going to use a "fresh" input, it transmits an encryption of "1" to the other party; otherwise, it sends an encryption of "0". The encryptions are obtained using a CPA-secure (homomorphic) PKE scheme (G,Ẽ,D). Then, the party proves in ZK that "the last commitment transmitted hides an already used input and it encrypted 0, or the last commitment transmitted hides a fresh input and it encrypted 1 and the sum of all the plaintexts, encrypted until now, does not exceed the rate". A successful verification of this proof convinces the other party that the rate is not exceeded, leaking nothing more than this. We instantiate such ZK proofs for the OPE problem in Section 7. Notice that to generate such a proof each party needs to store all the ciphertexts transmitted to the other player, together with all the inputs and randomness used to generate the previous commitments. On the other hand, to verify the other party's proof, one needs to store the ciphertexts and the commitments received in all earlier executions. The remainder of the messages exchanged during each execution, however, can be discarded.
The construction of our rate-hiding ¦r1-limited compiler Ψ RH is depicted in Figure 1 .
We refer the reader to Appendix C.1 for the proof of Theorem 5.1.
A Rate-Revealing Compiler
The Overview. Once again, we divide the cf-SFE protocol into a committing phase and a function evaluation phase and introduce a new phase in between where P 1 and P 2 convince each other that the current input has already been used in a previous execution. Note that the parties need to maintain a state variable Γ collecting the input commitments sent and received in all earlier executions. During the j-th execution, given a list of input commitments (and the corresponding inputs and randomness) for all the previous executions, party P i can prove in ZK that the input commitment generated in the current execution is for the same value as one of the commitments collected previously. Party P 3−i also needs to collect the same set of commitments in order to verify
Let (G,Ẽ,D) be a public key encryption scheme. Parties P 1 and P 2 hold an auxiliary key pair (pk i ,sk i ) ←G(1 λ ). Given as input a commit-first protocol
, and a number of executions , the compiled protocol π f is made of three phases, described below. Party P 1 and P 2 keep the state variables Σ i := (Γ i , (Ω 1 , Ω 2 ), Λ i ) initially set to be empty. For each execution j ∈ [ ], π f proceeds as follows:
Committing Phase: Parties P 1 and P 2 , holding respectively inputs x j 1 and x j 2 , run the protocol π 1 f yielding the output (γ
Proof of Repeated-Input Phase: When the input x j i of party P i is not fresh-i.e., it has already been used in a previous execution-P i computes c 
and let (Pr, Vr) be a ZK proof system for (
and plays the role of the prover in (Pr, Vr); otherwise, it outputs ⊥ and aborts. Also, party P i receives c Protocol Emulation Phase: P 1 and P 2 run the protocol π 2 f on the same inputs as in the committing phase, yielding the output (y the statement proven by P i . The remainder of the messages exchanged during each execution, however, can be discarded. We note that while in general efficient ZK proofs of repeated inputs might be hard to find, for discrete-logarithm based statements, there exist efficient techniques for proving such statements. We refer the reader to Appendix D for more details. We also instantiate such ZK proofs for the OPE problem in Section 7. A complete description of the compiler is depicted in Figure 2 . We prove the following result:
Proof. Consider an adversary A = (A 1 , . . . , A ) corrupting party P i during the executions of π f . In particular, A j represents A's strategy during the j-th execution, and real ¦r1
denotes the distribution of its output. We denote by real ¦r1 π f ,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ, ) the joint distribution of the output of all the A j s combined. Note that each A j passes the necessary state information (i.e., her view) to A j+1 .
We describe a simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ) in the ideal world-as discussed in Section 4-that mimics A's output. Before doing so, note that we are given as input to the compiler Ψ RR (besides the rates and ) the commit-first SFE protocol π f . According to the security definition (cf.
Rate-Revealing Compiler Ψ RR :
Given as input a commit-first protocol
, and a number of executions , the compiled protocol π f is made of three phases, described below. Party P 1 and P 2 keep the state variables Γ 1 , Γ 2 := ∅, respectively. For each execution j ∈ [ ], π f proceeds as follows.
Proof of Repeated-Input Phase: Consider the following language: L i = {γ ∈ C pk i : ∃(x, r, r ) s.t. γ = C(pk i , x; r) ∧ C(pk i , x; r ) ∈ Γ 3−i }, and let (Pr, Vr) be a ZK proof system for L i . The following is executed for all i ∈ {1, 2}. When the input x j i of party P i is not fresh-i.e., it has already been used in a previous execution-P i plays the role of the prover in (Pr, Vr). When the input x j i is fresh, P i just forwards the empty string ε. Also, party P i plays the role of the verifier in (Pr, Vr) (with P 3−i being the prover and L 3−i being the underlying language). If the value ε is received or if the verification of the proof fails, P i updates the rate by letting ¦r1 3−i := ¦r1 3−i − 1 and the state by letting Γ i := Γ i ∪ {γ j 3−i }. If ¦r1 3−i < 0, then party P i output ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, if the verification is successful, the state and rate information will not be modified.
Protocol Emulation Phase: P 1 and P 2 run the protocol π 2 f on the same inputs as in the committing phase, yielding the output (y Definition 3.1), for any admissible adversary against π f , there exists a simulator S cf that mimics her behavior in the cf-SFE's ideal world. Moreover, due to the way the cf-SFE ideal world is defined, S cf can be naturally written as S cf = (S 1 cf , S 2 cf ) where basically S 1 cf emulates the commit-first phase (i.e., π 1 f ), and passes its view to S 2 cf who emulates the function evaluation phase (i.e., π 2 f ). The simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ), runs a copy of A, and keeps a state Γ i initially set to be empty. The j-th execution is given below.
2. In the committing phase, S j invokes S 1 cf on input (x j i , pk 1 , pk 2 ). The simulator S 1 cf invokes A j who controls party P i in π 1 f . If S 1 cf sends ⊥ to its cf-SFE TTP, S j sends ⊥ to its own trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Otherwise, S j receives x 
shows the number of distinct inputs used by the honest party P 3−i . If σ 3−i has been incremented since the last execution (this information is passed from S j−1 to S j ), then S j updates the state to Γ i := Γ i ∪ {γ j 3−i }. Otherwise, it internally runs 4 the ZK simulator S ZK proving to A j that γ j 3−i ∈ L 3−i . (Note that the last step involves the state Γ i .) 4 Notice that SZK may itself need to rewind A j . However, this is not an issue because our simulator S invokes different simulators sequentially; in particular, A j will be in a consistent state when SZK is done and S proceeds with the rest of the simulation.
S j also plays the role of the verifier in the zero-knowledge protocol (Pr, Vr) (with A j being the prover). If the value ε is received, or in case the corresponding input x j i is not used in one of the previous executions (note that S j can determine this by inspecting Γ i ), then S j updates the state to Γ i := Γ i ∪ {x j i , r j i }. Otherwise, the state is not modified. (Note that at this stage S j is not updating the state on the basis of the verification of the proof itself).
cf sends ⊥, S j sends ⊥ to its trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Else, S 2 cf sends the continue flag. S j replies (on behalf of the cf-SFE TTP) by sending to S 2 cf , the output y i it obtained earlier in the simulation. At the end of this phase, S j passes (y i , σ 3−i ) to A j and outputs whatever A j does.
We now need to show that ideal
. However, we focus on showing indistinguishability for a single execution (i.e., the j-th execution). A standard hybrid argument (omitted here) shows that the accumulative distributions are also computationally indistinguishable up to a negligible factor of 1/ . Next, we focus on showing that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and
We consider a series of intermediate hybrid experiments. In the first experiment, we modify the simulator by letting it update the state on the basis of the verification of the ZK proofs, as it would be done in a real execution of the protocol. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the soundness of the ZK proof. In the second experiment, we assume that in contrast to the simulation above, the real input of the honest party is used for the simulation. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme. In the last experiment, we replace the simulated ZK proof, with an actual ZK proof. The indistinguishability of the last two experiments, follows naturally from the zero-knowledge property of the proof. Finally, it is easy to see that the distribution of A j 's output in the last experiment is identical to the distribution of its output in the real protocol, which concludes our proof. A detailed description of the hybrid argument appears in Appendix C.2.
A Pattern-Revealing Compiler
In this section, we introduce a more efficient compiler Ψ PR for designing rate-limited SFE. Given as input a cf-SFE protocol, our compiler Ψ PR outputs a weaker form of rate-limited SFE where each party not only learns the current rate for its counterpart during each execution, but also the pattern of already used inputs. The main advantage is that this new compiler adds very little overhead to the original cf-SFE.
The Overview. The idea is as follows. Besides their input, each party also stores a secret key for a PRF (a different key for each party). Before invoking the commit-first SFE protocol, each player 5 We emphasize S 2 cf does not run a new instance of A j but it continues running the same instance that has been running so far.
Pattern-Revealing Compiler Ψ PR :
Given as input a commit-first protocol π f = (π 1 f , π 2 f ), a rate ¦r1 = (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 ), and a number of executions , the compiled protocol π f consists of three phases, described below. Party P 1 and P 2 hold private keys k 1 and k 2 and the state variables Γ 1 , Γ 2 := ∅, respectively. For each execution j ∈ [ ], π f proceeds as follows:
Randomness Generation Phase: Parties P 1 and P 2 , holding respectively inputs x Committing Phase: Parties P 1 and P 2 , run the protocol π 1 f on the same inputs as in the first phase yielding the output (γ ∈ Γ i , party P i adjusts his rate by letting ¦r1 i = ¦r1 i − 1. P i then updates its state
Protocol Emulation Phase: P 1 and P 2 run the protocol π 2 f on the same inputs as in the first phase, yielding the output (y generates the randomness it needs for the committing phase by applying the PRF on the chosen input for this execution. With this modification in place, the committing phase for each party becomes deterministic. If a party uses the same input in two executions, the two commitments its counterpart receives will be identical. As a result, to prove a repeated-input, each party can compare the commitment for the current execution with those used in the previous ones, and determine if the input is new or being repeated (hence also revealing the pattern). Note that the commitments still provide the required hiding and binding properties. The only overhead imposed by this compiler is the application of a PRF to generate the randomness for the committing phase.
We refer the reader to Appendix C.3 for the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Making the Compilers Stateless
One drawback of the compilers described in the previous section is that both P 1 and P 2 need to maintain state. To some extent, this assumption is necessary. It is not too hard to see that RL-SFE is impossible to achieve if neither party is keeping any information about the previous executions (we omit a formal argument of this statement). However, as discussed earlier, in many natural client-server applications of SFE in the real world, it is reasonable to assume that the servers keep state, while the clients typically do not.
In this section, we show how to modify the compilers from Section 5 in such a way that only one of the parties needs to keep state. Our solution is efficient and works for all three compilers we discussed earlier. Throughout this section, we assume P 1 is the client and P 2 is the server. Server P 2 receives no output (as it is usually the case in the client-server setting) and wants to enforce the rate limit ¦r1 for the client. Although P 1 does not maintain any state, it needs to make sure that P 2 handles the rate, honestly. On the other hand, the server also needs to be convinced that the client is not cheating, by exceeding the rate limit ¦r1.
The Overview. Note that in the stateful versions of our compilers, P 1 needs to keep state in order to generate a ZK proof of repeated inputs, and verify the corresponding statement being proven by P 2 . Since we are only enforcing the rate for P 1 , we can eliminate the latter ZK proofs, and focus on the first one. Although our approach is general, for the sake of simplicity, we describe it in relation to our rate-revealing compiler from Section 5.2. The same idea can be applied to make the other compilers stateless. The basic idea is simple: We ask the server to store the list of all the commitments previously sent by P 1 who sends the list to the client, during each run. For this simple approach to work, we need to address several important issues:
• For the client to learn the current rate and the previously queried inputs before each execution, it needs to store these values on the server side in a secure way. This can be easily addressed by having P 1 encrypt the message and randomness for each commitment (using a symmetrickey encryption) and send it along with the commitment itself. P 1 will just keep the private key for the encryption scheme.
• The client needs to verify that the list of commitments it receives from the server are the original commitments it sent in the previous executions. To do so, in each run P 1 computes a MAC φ of the string obtained by hashing all the commitments (i.e., the concatenation of the list it obtains from the server and the one it creates in the current execution) and sends it to the server. 6 In each execution, it requests this MAC, the list of commitments along with the ciphertext storing the inputs and random coins from the server. Due to the unforgeability of the MAC, the server will only be able to use a correct list of commitments, previously issued and MACed by the client itself.
• It may seem that the above solution still allows the server to cheat and only send a subset of the commitment list along with a tag generated for that subset in one of the earlier executions, to the client. This would potentially make the input to the current execution look "new" and allow the server to decrease the rate. The client would not be able to detect this attack since it does not keep state and does not know the total number of commitments. However, a more careful inspection shows that the above does not really constitute an attack. In fact, the tag φ already binds the current rate to the current list of commitments, and prevents the server from decreasing the rate in this fashion. In particular, it is hard for the server to cook-up a state such that the verification of the tag is successful, and the client will think its rate is already exceeded when it is not. Essentially, coming up with such a state requires to find a collision in H or forging a tag for a fake list of commitments.
A detailed description of the compiler is depicted in Figure 4 , and the proof to the following theorem is given in Appendix C.4.
Rate-Revealing Compiler Ψ RR (stateless version):
Let (G, T, V) be a MAC, (G,Ẽ,D) be a SKE scheme and H be a CRHF. Party P 1 stores values (pk, k,k) where
and a number of executions , the compiled protocol π f consists of four phases, described below. Party P 2 initializes the state variable Σ := ∅. For each execution j ∈ [ ], π f proceeds as follows.
Recovery of State Phase: Party P 1 receives the state Σ = {Γ, Ω, φ} from P 2 , where
and φ is a tag. Hence, P 1 computes h = H(γ 1 1 , . . . , γ
Proof of Repeated-Input Phase: If x j 1 is indeed being repeated, party P 1 proceeds to give a ZK proof of this fact, as described in the protocol of Figure 2 . (Notice that this involves the recovered state Λ j−1 .) Otherwise, P 1 checks that s ≤ ¦r1 and forwards the empty string ε if this is the case. If the rate is exceeded, P 1 outputs ⊥ and aborts. Provided that it did not abort, P 1 updates the hash value h := H(γ 1 , . . . , γ j ), computes φ ← T(k, h) and forwards φ to P 2 .
Party P 2 verifies the proof and updates the rate ¦r1 as specified in the protocol from 7 Rate-Limited OPE Hazay and Lindell [35] design an efficient two-party protocol for oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) with security against malicious adversaries. In an OPE protocol, the first party holds a value t while the second party holds a polynomial p of degree d. Their goal is to let the first party learn p(t) without revealing anything else. The protocol takes advantage of an additively homomorphic encryption scheme (Paillier's encryption) and efficient ZK proofs of a few statements related to the encryption scheme. While the authors (only) prove security against malicious adversaries, we observe that, with a small modification, their construction is indeed a commit-first protocol for OPE as well. First party's commitment. Consider an additively homomorphic encryption scheme (G, E, D) . The first few steps performed by the first party (the party holding the value t) are as follows: (i) it runs the key generation for the encryption scheme to generate a key pair (pk, sk) ← G(1 λ ), accompanied by a ZK proof of knowledge of the secret key; (ii) then, it encrypts powers of t, i.e. E(pk, t), E(pk, t 2 ), . . . , E(pk, t d ), and sends the resulting ciphertexts along with a ZK proof of the validity of the ciphertexts to the other party.
We observe that sending E(pk, t) and a ZK proof of its validity constitutes a commitment by the first party to its input t. This commitment scheme realizes the ideal functionality of the first phase in our definition of commit-first protocols. (Recall that this means the simulator can extract both the input and the randomness used to generate the commitment.) In particular, a careful inspection of the security proof of [35] reveals that the simulator can extract both t and the randomness used to encrypt it during the simulation. Extracting the randomness is possible since in Paillier's encryption scheme, given the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, one can recover both the randomness and the message.
Second party's commitment. The commitment of the second party to its input polynomial is slightly more subtle, and requires a small modification to the original design. In the first few steps, the second party does the following: (i) it runs the key generation to generate a key pair (pk , sk ) ← G(1 λ ), accompanied by a ZK proof of knowledge of the secret key; (ii) it computes ((E(pk , q 1 ), E(pk , p − q 1 )), . . . , (E(pk , q s ), E(pk , p − q s )) where q i 's are random polynomials of degree d for some security parameter s; (iii) it sends all the ciphertext pairs along with ZK proofs of the fact that the homomorphic addition of every pair encrypts the same polynomial (i.e., p), to the first party. We need to slightly modify this step to realize our ideal commitment functionality: For the first pair of ciphertexts, the second party will also include a ZK proof of validity of (E(pk , q 1 ), E(pk , p − q 1 )).
The pair of ciphertexts (E(pk , q 1 ), E(pk , p−q 1 )) and the accompanied ZK proof of their validity, constitute the commitment by the second party to its input polynomial p. Once again, we note that the simulator in the proof is able to extract q 1 , p, and the randomness used in the two encryptions, due to the randomness recovering property of Paillier's encryption. The proof of security provided in [35] can be easily modified to show the commit-first property of the above-mentioned variant of their OPE construction.
Claim 7.1
The modified oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol of [35] is a commit-first SFE with security against malicious adversaries.
ZK Proofs for Rate-Limited OPE
We now explain how to derive rate-limited OPE protocols from the scheme of [35] , by giving concrete instantiation of our compilers from Section 5 and 6.
Rate-Revealing OPE. Consider first our rate-revealing compiler from Figure 2 . A proof of repeated-input, here, is equivalent to proving a statement for the following language:
where the ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c n are encryptions of the inputs for n previous executions of the OPE protocol. The ciphertextĉ is the encryption of the input for the current execution. Such a proof can be obtained by exploiting ZK proofs for the languages L zero and L mult defined in [35] . Informally, a valid proof of a statement in the language L zero says that a ciphertext is an encryption of 0. Language L mult allows us to prove that given three ciphertexts, one of them decrypts to the product of the other two underlying plaintexts. Denote the plaintext for each c i by m i and the one forĉ bym. The high level idea is to have the prover compute E(pk, (m − m 1 ) · · · (m − m n )), prove correctness of this computation and show that the final ciphertext is an encryption of zero. This clearly ensures correctness when the current input equals one of the inputs used in previous executions. See Appendix D for a complete description.
Rate-Hiding OPE. Next, consider our rate-hiding compiler from Figure 1 in Section 5.1. In this case, besides a standard proof of the statement "a ciphertext is a valid encryption of bit b", the prover also needs to prove that: (i) "the current commitment corresponds to a fresh input"; (ii) "given a collection of ciphertexts, the sum of the corresponding plaintexts is below some threshold ¦r1".
Note that a proof for the first statement is equivalent to proving that an element is not in L ope (denoted by L ope ). Moreover, we show that a proof for the second statement can also be reduced to a proof of membership in L ope by relying on the homomorphic properties of the underlying encryption scheme. It remains to show ZK proofs for L ope . It is possible to do so using range proofs, but we show a simple and more efficient construction.
Using techniques of [15] , the proofs discussed above can be combined (via conjuctive/disjunctive formulas) to generate a ZK proof of membership for the language used in our rate-hiding compiler. A more detailed description is given in Appendix D.
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A Primitives
Commitment Schemes. A (non-interactive) commitment scheme consists of a triple of efficient algorithms (G, C, D) defined as follows. Upon input the security parameter λ, the probabilistic algorithm G outputs a key pk. Associated to pk are a message space M pk and a commitment space C pk . Upon input the key pk and message m ∈ M pk (and implicit random coins r), the probabilistic algorithm C outputs (γ, δ) ← C(pk, m; r) where γ belongs to C pk , while δ is the decommitment information needed to open the commitment. Typically δ = (m, r). Upon input the key pk, a message m, and a commitment-pair (γ, δ), the deterministic algorithm D outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. A commitment scheme should be complete, i.e., for any security parameter λ, any pk ← G(1 λ ), for any message m ∈ {0, 1} * and any (γ, δ) ← C(pk, m) we have D(pk, m, δ, γ) = 1. In addition, commitment schemes are defined by their security properties binding and hiding. Roughly speaking, the binding property says that a sender is unable to change the message he committed to once the commitment phase is over. The hiding property says that a receiver cannot learn the message from the commitment. Note that one of the properties are satisfied statistically-and thus secure against unbounded adversaries-whereas the other is computationally achieved.
Sometimes the public value pk is not needed; in this case a commitment scheme is simply denoted as (C, D) omitting the algorithm G. Non-interactive commitment schemes exists based on explicit hardness assumptions, e.g. Pedersen's commitment [50] , and more in general from any one-way permutation [28] .
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. A decision problem related to a language L ⊆ {0, 1} * requires to determine if a given string x is in L or not. We can associate to any NP-language L a polynomialtime recognizable relation R defining L itself, that is L = {x : ∃w s.t. R(x, w) = 1}, where |w| is at most polynomial in |x|. The string w is called a witness for membership of x ∈ L.
A proof of membership (or simply a proof) for a language L, is a possibly interactive protocol (Pr, Vr) between two parties where the prover Pr convinces the verifier Vr that some string x belongs to a given language L. The prover and the verifier itself, constitute what is called a (possibly interactive) proof system. Below, we give an high level overview of the main properties of a proof system, referring the reader to, e.g., [26, Chapter 4] for formal definitions.
Informally, a proof should be convincing in the sense that a proof for an element x ∈ L is always accepted (this is the so called completeness property) and that it should be hard to come up with an accepting proof for an element x ∈ L (this is the so called soundness property). An important class of proof systems is the class of zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems. Loosely speaking, a proof is ZK if it does not yield any information beyond the validity of the statement being proven. Non-interactive zero-knowledge is impossible without assuming some set-up, e.g. in the form of a common reference string or an idealized function behaving as a random oracle.
An important result in the theory of zero-knowledge is that every language in NP admits a ZK proof system [30] . In particular, if there exist proof systems for language L 1 , L 2 in NP, then it is possible to prove arbitrary combinations of statements from the two languages, e.g., it is possible to prove statements of the form (
Pseudo-Random Functions. Roughly, a pseudo-random function PRF : K × M → N is (computationally) indistinguishable from a truly random function where K represents the key space, M the message space, and N the output space. More precisely, we say that PRF is a pseudo-random function if for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers
, where k ∈ K is chosen uniformly at random and R is chosen uniformly from the set of functions mapping to N .
Public Key Encryption.
A public key encryption scheme is a triple of efficient algorithms (G, E, D) defined as follows. Upon input the security parameter λ, the probabilistic algorithm G outputs a pair (pk, sk). Associated to pk are a message space M pk and a ciphertext space C pk . Upon input the key pk and message m ∈ M pk (and implicit random coins r), the probabilistic algorithm E outputs c ← E(pk, m; r) where c belongs to C pk . Upon input the key sk and a ciphertext c, the deterministic algorithm D outputs a message m ∈ M pk . An encryption scheme should be complete, i.e., for any security parameter λ, any (pk, sk) ← G(1 λ ), for any message m ∈ M pk and any c ← E(pk, m) we have D(sk, c) = m.
The standard security notions for encryption are CPA-security [31] and CCA-security [51] . Roughly, an encryption scheme is CPA-secure if an adversary is not able to distinguish the encryption of two chosen messages; CCA-security require that the above holds even for an adversary who is given access to the decryption algorithm.
Symmetric Key Encryption. A symmetric key encryption scheme is a triple of efficient algorithms (G, E, D) and similar to its public key counterpart essentially differing merely that the key generation algorithm only outputs the secret key, i.e., sk ← G. Correspondingly, the both algorithms for encryption and decryption takes sk as input. Completeness as above should be provided by the scheme. In addition, the standard security properties here are CPA [31] and CCA [51] with respect to symmetric key encryption schemes.
Collision resistant hashing. Our compiler makes use of a collision-resistant hash function (CRHF). For a set I ∈ {0, 1} * and integers l, l ∈ N such that l > l , a family of hash functions {H κ } κ∈I is a collection of polynomial-time computable functions H : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l , together with an efficient algorithm that on input a security parameter λ outputs an index κ ∈ I indicating a particular function in {H κ } κ∈I . A family of hash functions is called collision-resistant if for any efficient algorithm A that is given as input the index κ ∈ I, the probability that A outputs (m, m ) such that H κ (m) = H κ (m ) with m = m is negligible (where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A and of the generation algorithm). To simplify notation, we say simply H(m) to denote H κ (m) where κ is sampled from the generation process and implicitly given.
Message Authentication Codes. A message authentication code (MAC) (G, T, V) is a triple
of efficient algorithms such that G upon input security parameter 1 λ outputs a key k, and T for input k and message m ∈ {0, 1} * deterministically outputs a tag φ = T(k, m). Correctness requires that for any k ← G(1 λ ), any message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the algorithm V(k, m, T(k, m)) outputs 1.
The standard security notion for message authentication codes is universal unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UNF-CMA). Roughly, a message authentication code is UNF-CMA if an adversary A is not able to come up with a message m * and a tag φ * such that V(k, m * , φ * ) = 1 for k ← KGen(1 λ ), even if A is allowed to ask for tags of arbitrary chosen messages m = m * .
A.1 Instantiations of Commit-First SFE

A.1.1 The GMW Compiler
The GMW compiler [29] is a general transformation for compiling any SFE with security against semi-honest adversaries into one with security against malicious ones. We observe that the malicious SFE resulting from the GMW compiler is also a commit-first protocol. This is of theoretical interest: when combined with the compilers we introduce in this paper, it yields a general compiler for transforming any semi-honest SFE into a rate-limited malicious SFE.
Recall the GMW compiler which consists of the following three phases: (i) Input-committing phase: Each party commits to the input he will use in the protocol, (ii) Coin-generation phase: Each party receives a uniformly random string to use in the protocol emulation phase, while others obtain a commitment to that randomness (iii) Protocol emulation phase: Parties engage in a protocol where each message of the semi-honest SFE is accompanied with proofs of correctness of the computation and its consistency with the committed inputs and randomness.
We refer the reader to [27] for a complete description of the compiler and a proof that it yields an SFE with security against malicious adversaries. It turns out that the input-committing phase of the GMW compiler is exactly what we need in a commit-first protocol. In particular, the functionality of the input-committing phase for the first party is defined in [27] as ((x, r), 1 n ) → (λ, C(x, r)), where C is a hiding and binding commitment scheme. Then, a construction is provided that realizes this functionality in presence of malicious adversaries. 7 This is identical to the functionality computed by the trusted party (once for P 1 and once for P 2 ) in the first phase of the ideal execution for a commit-first SFE we defined above. This observation yields the following claim.
Claim A.1 The GMW compiler transforms any SFE protocol with security against semi-honest adversaries into a commit-first SFE protocol with security against malicious adversaries.
A.1.2 Yao's Garbled Circuits Protocol
Here, we investigate the commit-first property of Yao's garbled circuit protocol [53, 54]. Yao's protocol is one of the most important general-purpose two-party SFE constructions. In particular, due to its desirable efficiency properties, it has been the subject of multiple software implementations [44, 36, 38] . Currently, the most efficient method for making Yao's protocol secure against malicious adversaries is the cut-and-choose approach [47, 42] .
We observe that Yao's protocol is one-sided commit-first. In other words, one of the parties in the protocol commits to his input during the protocol in such a way that the simulator in the ideal world is able to extract the corresponding message and randomness. We note that the onesided commit-first property is indeed sufficient for many applications of rate-limited SFE where one is only interested in monitoring the rate for one party. For instance, this is the case in most client-server applications, where the server enforces the rate limit on the client.
Commit-first Yao via commit-first OT. We do not discuss the details of Yao's constructions here and refer the reader to [43] for a detailed description. However, we recall that in the cutand-choose approach, the first party (garbler) computes multiple garbled circuits while the second party (evaluator) evaluates a fraction of these circuits. To proceed with the evaluation, the first step taken by the evaluator in the protocol is a series of oblivious transfers, one for each bit of its input. The evaluator plays the role of the receivers in each OT, and uses one input bit in each. The garbler plays the role of the sender, and uses two garbled values (corresponding to an input wire) as its input. For Yao's garbled circuit protocol to be one-sided commit-first (with respect to the evaluator in this case), we simply need to make sure that the oblivious transfer being used is commit-first itself (in addition to begin secure against malicious adversaries). In particular, we need a guarantee that the receiver in the OT is committed to its input, and that the simulator in the security proof is able to extract both the message and the randomness used in the commitment.
Commit-first OT. There are multiple OT constructions that satisfy the commit-first property. For example, consider the general construction of [41] based on any homomorphic encryption. We observe that if the homomorphic encryption scheme being used is randomness-recovering (i.e. the decryption algorithm recovers both the message and the randomness), the resulting OT will be commit-first. Consequently, the instantiation of their construction based on Paillier's encryption [49] yields a commit-first OT.
A second option is to use the OPE construction we discussed in Section 7 to instantiate the OT in the Yao's protocol. Note that the OPE problem is a generalization of oblivious transfer. The OT sender with an input pair (a 0 , a 1 ) can let its polynomial be p(x) = a 0 (1 − x) + a 1 x, while the receiver can use its input bit b as the input to the polynomial. It is easy to see that p(b) = a b for b ∈ {0, 1}. There is one small issue with this OT construction. It is not fully-secure against malicious adversaries in the form we described. In particular, a malicious receiver can choose a value for b that is not a bit. This issues can, however, be easily fixed by adding an efficient ZK proof of the statement that the plaintext corresponding to E(pk, b) is either the message 0 or 1. Since the OPE construction we discussed is commit-first, so is the resulting commit-first OT.
Summarizing the above discussion, we conclude with the following claim:
Claim A.2 When instantiated via a commit-first OT, cut-and-choose compilations of Yao's garbled circuit, are one-sided commit-first (with respect to the circuit evaluator) with security against malicious adversaries.
A.1.3 Secure 2PC of Jarecki-Shmatikov
Jarecki and Shmatikov [40] design a variant of Yao's garbled circuits protocol for securely computing any two-party circuit on committed inputs. Their protocol is secure in a universally composable way in the presence of malicious adversaries, in the common reference string model. Their construction starts by having the two parties commit to their inputs. Then, a variant of Yao's protocol is design to operate on these committed inputs. Both the commitment scheme and the symmetric-key encryption needed in Yao's garbled circuit construction are instantiated via a simplified variant of the Camenisch-Shoup (CS) encryption scheme [11] . The computation is accompanied with efficient ZK proofs that are specially designed to work with the CS scheme. We refer the reader to [40] for a complete description of their construction.
Their construction can be easily transformed to a commit-first protocol in the CRS model. The protocol starts with each party committing to its input and proving the validity of the commitment. As mentioned above, the commitment scheme used is a simplified CS encryption. Unfortunately, knowing the secret key for the encryption scheme does not allow one to recover the randomness used for encryption as well. However, our commit-first ideal execution requires this property. In other words, the simulator in the proof needs to send both the message and the randomness used by the commitment scheme to the TTP. However, as mentioned by the authors themselves, a wide range of other commitment schemes can also be used for this purpose. To satisfy the commit-first property, we simply need to make sure that the randomness used in the commitment is recoverable given a trapdoor (or the secret key itself). This is efficiently realizable, for example, using Paillier's encryption scheme, in which the decryption algorithm recovers the randomness as well, hence yielding a commit-first variant of their construction: Claim A.3 The two-party protocol of [40] is a commit-first SFE with security against malicious adversaries, in the CRS model.
A.1.4 PSI Protocol of Hazay and Nissim
In the private set intersection problem, two parties P 1 and P 2 , hold the sets X and Y . Their goal is for one or both parties to learn X ∩Y without revealing additional information about their sets. The PSI problem has been the focus of active research, and to date, many constructions with a variety of efficiency and security properties have been designed and even implemented [21, 19, 33, 37] .
Here, we focus on the protocol of Hazay and Nissim [33] , since it is secure against malicious adversaries and we can easily show it to be a one-sided commit-first protocol as well. Once again, we do not describe the details of their construction but mostly focus on the components we need to prove the commit-first property. In particular, we observe that one of the parties engaged in the protocol, say P 1 holding the set X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } starts by computing the commitments C(x i , r i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and proving knowledge of x i and r i to P 2 . This indeed constitutes a commitment to the set X, and allows the simulator in the proof to extract both the set X and the randomness used in the commitments, hence yielding a commit-first protocol with respect to P 1 .
Claim A. 4 The private set intersection protocol of [33] is one-sided commit-first with security against malicious adversaries.
A.1.5 Oblivious Automata Evaluation of Gennaro, Hazay and Sorensen
In an oblivious automata evaluation (OAE) protocol, party P 1 holds a description of an automation Γ whereas party P 2 holds a string t. After the execution of OAE, party P 1 obtains Γ(t), and P 2 learns nothing.
In [24] , Gennaro, Hazay and Sorensen introduce a secure OAE protocol in presence of malicious adversaries. At a high level, party P 1 and P 2 first agree on a public key for an encryption scheme. Then, party P 1 sends the transition table of Γ in encrypted form together with a ZK-proof of its validity. Party P 2 is then able to work on this ciphertext in order to evaluate its input string t. Eventually, P 2 proves validity of the last ciphertext.
Similar to the OPE protocol in Section 7, the encryption and its proof of validity can be seen as a commitment by party P 1 to his input. This takes place before the actual automata evaluation is performed. However, party P 2 proves validity at the end of the execution. Hence, we observe here a one-sided commit-first oblivious automata evaluation protocol with respect to party P 1 .
Claim A.5 The oblivious automata evaluation protocol of [24] is a one-sided commit-first OAE with security against malicious adversaries.
B Relation between Notions of Rate-Limited SFE
It is immediate to see that rate-hiding SFE is strictly stronger than rate-revealing SFE. In fact, the simulator in the definition of rate-revealing SFE protocol can simply drop the outputs (σ i , σ 3−i ) to mimic the simulator in the definition of rate-hiding SFE. However, the opposite direction does not hold.
As for the relationship between rate-revealing and pattern-revealing, we have the following simple observation.
Observation 1 Any secure rate-revealing (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol π is also a secure patternrevealing (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol. The converse is not true in general.
Proof. Fix the functionality f underlying protocol π. To prove the first direction, it suffices to show that the output of the simulator S in the rate-revealing definition can be efficiently produced starting from the output of the simulator S in the pattern-revealing definition; since the latter simulator is stronger, it follows that any secure rate-revealing protocol is also a secure patternrevealing protocol (and so the latter notion is weaker). After j executions, for j = 1, . . . , , S knows vectors J 1 = (J 1 1 , . . . , J On the other hand, it is easy to see that in general the output distribution of S cannot be simulated from the output of S. The reason is that S only knows a monotonically increasing sequence of natural numbers σ j i . When two elements are repeated, S knows the corresponding input has already been used in a previous execution, but is not necessarily able to determine exactly in which execution and thus cannot derive the complete pattern. Consider for instance the case where σ 1 1 = 1 and σ 2 1 , . . . , σ 1 = 2; then S can mimic S 's output only with probability 2 − .
C Missing Proofs C.1 Proof to Theorem 5.1 (Rate-hiding)
The construction of our rate-hiding ¦r1-limited compiler Ψ RH is depicted in Figure 1 . Next, we provide the proof to Theorem 5.1 showing its security. A = (A 1 , . . . , A ) corrupting party P i during the executions of π f . In particular, A j represents A's strategy during the jth execution, and real ¦r1 π f ,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j denotes the distribution of its output. We denote by real ¦r1−RH π f ,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ, ) the joint distribution of the output of all the A j s combined. Note that each A j passes the necessary state information (i.e., her view) to A j+1 .
Proof. Consider an adversary
We describe a simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ) in the ideal world-as discussed in Section 4-that mimics A's output. Before doing so, note that we are given as input to the compiler Ψ RH (besides the rates and ) the commit-first SFE protocol π f . According to the security definition (cf. Definition 3.1), for any admissible adversary against π f , there exists a simulator S cf that mimics her behavior in the cf-SFE's ideal world. Moreover, due to the way the cf-SFE ideal world is defined, S cf can be naturally written as S cf = (S 1 cf , S 2 cf ) where basically S 1 cf emulates the commit-first phase (i.e., π 1 f ), and passes its view to S 2 cf who emulates the function evaluation phase (i.e., π 2 f ). The simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ) picks (pk,sk) ←G(1 λ ), runs a copy of A, and keeps a state Σ = (Γ, (Ω 1 , Ω 2 ), Λ) initially set to be empty. The jth execution is given below.
1. S j takes (x j i , Σ, (pk 1 , pk 2 ), (pk,sk), z j ) as input.
2. In the committing phase, S j invokes S 1 cf on input (x j i , pk 1 , pk 2 ). The simulator S 1 cf invokes A j who controls party P i in π 1 f . If S 1 cf sends ⊥ to its cf-SFE TTP, S j sends ⊥ to its own trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Otherwise, S j receives x 4. Finally, S j invokes S 2 cf on input (x j i , γ j 3−i , pk 1 , pk 2 ); S 2 cf itself runs A j who controls party P i in π 2 f . 8 If S 2 cf sends ⊥, S j sends ⊥ to its trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Else, S 2 cf sends the continue flag. S j replies (on behalf of the cf-SFE TTP) by sending to S 2 cf , the output y i he obtained earlier in the simulation.
At the end of this phase, S j passes y i to A j and outputs whatever A j does.
We now need to show that
However, we focus on showing indistinguishability for a single execution (i.e., the jth execution). A standard hybrid argument (omitted here) shows that the accumulative distributions are also computationally indistinguishable up to a negligible factor of 1/ . Next, we focus on showing that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and
We consider a series of intermediate hybrid experiments. In the first experiment, we modify the simulator by letting it abort the execution on the basis of the verification of the ZK proofs, as it would be done in a real execution of the protocol. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the soundness of the ZK proof. In the second experiment, we assume that in contrast to the simulation above, the real input of the honest party is used in the simulation. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the hiding property of the commitment and the PKE schemes. In the last experiment, we replace the simulated ZK proof, with an actual ZK proof. The indistinguishability of the last two experiments, follows naturally from the zero-knowledge property of the proof. Finally, it is easy to see that the distribution of A j 's output in the last experiment is identical to the distribution of its output in the real protocol, which concludes our proof. Details follow:
In the first hybrid experiment, we replace S j by S j 1 who controls P i in the ideal world. Essentially S j 1 is different from S j merely in the way it aborts the simulation based on the execution of (Pr, Vr). Namely, in case the rate ¦r1 3−i is not exceeded, instead of looking at the output from the trusted party (cf. item 3. in the description of S j ), it first plays the role of the verifier as party P 3−i would do in a real execution of the protocol. Hence, if the verification fails the value ⊥ is sent to A j and the execution is halted. Everything else is identical to the previous simulation. Next, we argue that
8 We emphasize S 2 cf does not run a new instance of A j but it continues with running the same instance that has been running so far.
In fact, the modification above only affects the way the execution is halted. Denote with bad the event that A is able to come up with an accepting proof for a false statement, i.e., A is able to convince P 3−i that the rate ¦r1 i is not exceeded even though it already reached the rate itself. Note that the distribution produced by the two experiments above is identical provided that bad does not happen. Due to the soundness property of the ZK proof system, we must conclude that bad happens at most with negligible probability, thus showing that the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable.
In the second hybrid experiment, we replace S j 1 by S j 2 who controls P i in the ideal world and at the same time plays the role of the TTP playing all the roles by itself. As a result, the simulator directly interacts with P 3−i during the ideal execution of the commit-first protocol. Essentially, S j 2 is identical to S j 1 with the exception that it is able to compute and send the correct commitment γ Everything else is analogous to the previous simulation. Next, we argue that
Note that the only difference between the previous hybrid and the hybrid world described above is that the real input of the honest party is used in the simulation. 9 In particular, S However, due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme, these two views are computationally indistinguishable. (In particular any distinguisher can be turned into an adversary breaking either the hiding property of the commitment or the CPA-security of the PKE scheme.) It is worth noting that, we rely on the fact that in both worlds, the simulator emulates the ZK proof using S ZK as opposed to executing the real proof. In particular, the ZK simulator does not need the parties' private inputs for its simulation, and hence is not affected by the aforementioned change in the inputs.
We modify the previous hybrid world, by having S j 3 provide an actual ZK proof that the rate is not exceeded or to output ⊥ if this is not case. For this purpose, S j 3 uses the state Σ and the current inputs x j 1 , x j 2 . The zero-knowledge property of the proof system automatically guarantees that the view generated using the real proof and the simulator S ZK are computationally indistinguishable which in turn implies the computational indistinguishability of the output of the current hybrid experiment and the last. Thus, we have
To conclude the proof, it suffices to note that H 3 f,A(z),i (x i , x 3−i , λ) j exactly equals the output distribution of A j in the real world, thus proving that π f ← Ψ RH (π f , ¦r1 1 , ¦r1 2 , ) is a secure ratehiding (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol for function f .
C.2 Completing the Hybrid Argument for Rate-Revealing Compiler (Theorem 5.2)
In the first hybrid experiment, we replace S j by S j 1 who controls P i in the ideal world. Essentially S j 1 is different from S j merely in the way it updates the state Γ i . Namely, instead of looking at the output σ 3−i and checking that x j i is not used in one of the previous executions (cf. item 3. in the description of S j ), it first plays the role of the verifier in (Pr, Vr) as party P 3−i would do in a real execution of the protocol. Hence, if the verification fails or the value ε is received, the state is updated as
The verification process is also applied to the proof returned by the ZK simulator S ZK , and the value γ j 3−i is eventually added to the state depending on the outcome of the verification procedure. Otherwise, the state is not modified. Everything else is identical to the previous simulation. Next, we argue that
In fact, the modification above only affects the way Γ i is updated. Denote with bad the event that A is able to come up with an accepting proof for a false statement, i.e., A is able to convince P 3−i that a fresh input is equal to one of the previously used inputs. Note that the distribution produced by the two experiments above is identical provided that bad does not happen. Due to the soundness property of the ZK proof system, we must conclude that bad happens at most with negligible probability, thus showing that the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable.
In the second hybrid experiment, we replace S j 1 by S j 2 who controls P i in the ideal world and at the same time plays the role of the TTP playing all the roles by itself. As a result, S j 2 directly interacts with P 3−i during the ideal execution of the commit-first protocol. Essentially, S j 2 is identical to S j 1 with the exception that it is able to compute and send the correct commitment γ j 3−i = C(pk 3−i , x j 3−i ; r j 3−i ) to A j . Also, S j 2 needs to simulate the values (σ i , σ 3−i ) by itself. This is done as it would be done in a real execution of the protocol. More precisely, σ i (resp. σ 3−i ) is modified based on the verification of the ZK proof (Pr, Vr) for language L i (resp. L 3−i ). Here, the simulator will also check whether the values σ 1 , σ 2 exceed the rates ¦r1 1 , ¦r1 2 and output ⊥ if so. Finally, note that S 2 cf is now invoked on the correct inputs, i.e., x j 3−i and γ j 3−i . Everything else is analogous to the previous simulation. Next, we argue that
Note that the only difference between the previous hybrid and the hybrid world described above is that the real input of the honest party is used in the simulation. 10 In particular, S j 2 feeds both S 1 cf and S 2 cf with the commitment C(pk 3−i , x j 3−i ; r j 3−i ) to the real input x j 3−i as opposed to an arbitrary input x j 3−i . However, due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme, these two views are computationally indistinguishable. It is worth noting that, we rely on the fact that in both worlds, the simulator emulates the ZK proof using S ZK as opposed to executing the real proof. In particular, the ZK simulator does not need the parties' private inputs for its simulation, and hence is not affected by the aforementioned change in the inputs.
We modify the previous hybrid world, by having S j 3 provide an actual ZK proof that an input is re-used from a previous execution or to send an empty string ε if this is not case. For this purpose, S The zero-knowledge property of the proof system automatically guarantees that the view generated using the real proof and the simulator S ZK are computationally indistinguishable which in turn implies the computational indistinguishability of the output of the current hybrid experiment and the last. Thus, we have
To conclude the proof, it suffices to note that H 3 f,A(z),i (x i , x 3−i , λ) j exactly equals the output distribution of A j in the real world, thus proving that π f ← Ψ RR (π f , ¦r1 1 , ¦r1 2 , ) is a secure raterevealing (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol for function f .
C.3 Proof to Theorem 5.3 (Pattern-revealing)
A detailed description of our pattern-revealing compiler appears in Figure 3 .
We give now the formal proof of Theorem 5.3.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2, we consider an adversary A = (A 1 , . . . , A ) corrupting party P i during the executions of π f where A j represents A's strategy during the j-th execution. Again, we denote by real ¦r1−PR π f ,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ, ) the joint distribution of the output of all the A j s combined.
We describe a simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ) in the ideal world that mimics A's output. Our simulator makes use of the simulator S cf which exists due to the fact, that our compiler was given as input a commit-first SFE protocol π f . The simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ), runs a copy of A, and keeps a state Γ i . In addition, S maintains a list Γ . Both Γ i and Γ are initially set to be empty.
The j-th execution is given below.
2. In the randomness-generation phase, S j does nothing.
3. In the committing phase, S j invokes S 1 cf on input (x j i , pk 1 , pk 2 ). The simulator S 1 cf invokes A j who controls party P i in π 1 f . If S 1 cf sends ⊥ to its cf-SFE TTP, S j sends ⊥ to its own trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Otherwise, S j receives x 
and hence, ideal
. We consider two intermediate hybrid experiments. In the first experiment, we modify the simulator by generating the random coins for the commitments by an application of a PRF on the input. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the pseudorandomness property of a PRF. In the second experiment, we assume that in contrast to the simulation above, the real input of the honest party is used in the simulation. We argue that this modification is not distinguishable by the adversary A j due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme. It is easy to see that the distribution of A j 's output in the last experiment is identical to the distribution of its output in the real protocol, which concludes our proof. Details follow:
In the first hybrid experiment, we replace S j by S 3−i ) using secret key k 3−i which is given as input to the simulator. Note that we explicitly do not instantiate the randomness of the malicious party P i by a PRF since in the real world the party would also use possibly non-uniform randomness.
Next, we argue that
In fact, the modification above only affects the way the random coins of the commitments are generated. Denote with bad the event that A is able to notice the difference between these two hybrids, i.e., A guesses correctly γ j i is computed by different randomness. Note that the distribution produced by the two experiments above is identical provided that bad does not happen.
The pseudo-randomness property of PRF says that without knowledge of the secret key used by the PRF, the output of a PRF and a uniformly distributed value are indistinguishable. Therefore, we must conclude that bad happens at most with negligible probability; otherwise, the adversary would break the pseudo-randomness of PRF. Thus, we show that the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable.
Note that using the same random coins r for the same inputs x does not harm the binding and hiding properties of the commitment schemes.
In the second hybrid experiment, we replace S . S j 2 needs also to simulate the values (J i , J 3−i ) by itself. This is done as it would be done in a real execution of the protocol. More precisely, J i (resp. J 3−i ) is the second entry of (γ i , * ) ∈ Γ i (resp. (γ 3−i , * ) ∈ Γ 3−i ). Note that an entry (γ i , j * ) must be in Γ i since S j 1 , and thus S j 2 updates Γ i in Step 3 to ensure it. The simulator stores herewith the commitment and the execution number it first was sent.
The simulator will also check whether the values J 1 , J 2 exceed the rates ¦r1 1 , ¦r1 2 and output ⊥ if so. Finally, note that S 2 cf is now invoked on the correct inputs, i.e., x j 3−i and γ j 3−i . Everything else is analogous to the previous simulation. Next, we argue that
Note that the only difference between the previous hybrid and the hybrid world described above is that the real input of the honest party is used in the simulation. 11 In particular, S To conclude the proof, it suffices to note that H 2 f,A(z),i (x i , x 3−i , λ) j exactly equals the output distribution of A j in the real world, thus proving that π f ← Ψ PR (π f , ¦r1 1 , ¦r1 2 , ) is a secure patternrevealing (¦ r1 1 , ¦r1 2 )-limited protocol for function f .
C.4 Proof to Theorem 6.1 (Stateless Rate-Revealing Compiler) Figure 4 illustrates our stateless rate-revealing compiler in detail. Here, we provide the proof to Theorem 6.1 showing security of our stateless rate-revealing compiler.
Proof. Since the compiler is asymmetric, we need to deal with the corruption of P 1 and P 2 separately.
The client is corrupted. Assuming P 2 is honest, in each execution j ∈ [ ] party P 1 can perfectly reconstruct the state Λ j−1 thanks to the auxiliary keyk for the SKE scheme. Apart from the way the state is reconstructed, the compiler is essentially identical to the transformation of Figure 2 . Hence, the same simulator S in the proof of Theorem 5.2 will do here.
The server is corrupted. Consider an adversary A = (A 1 , . . . , A ) corrupting party P 2 during the executions of π f . We describe a simulator S = (S 1 , . . . , S ) in the ideal world -as discussed in Section 4-that mimics A's output. S initially picks k ← G(1 λ ) andk ← G(1 λ ), runs a copy of A, and keeps an array Σ initially set to be empty. The j-th execution is given below.
2. In the recovery of state phase, S j receives (Γ , Ω , φ ) from A j . Hence, it checks whether there exists an entry in Σ such that
. If the check fails, S j sends ⊥ to A j and halts the simulation, otherwise, it proceeds to the next step.
3. In the committing phase, S j invokes S 1 cf on input (x j 2 , pk, −). The simulator S 1 cf invokes A j who controls party P 2 in π 1 f . If S 1 cf sends ⊥ to its cf-SFE TTP, S j sends ⊥ to its own trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Otherwise, S j receives x j 2 from S 1 cf . S j also samples a random x j 1 ∈ M pk , computes γ 4. S j sends x j 2 to its TTP. If the TTP returns ⊥, meaning that the rate is exceeded, the simulator sends also ⊥ to A j and aborts. Otherwise, S j receives (−, σ j ) back. Recall that σ j shows the number of distinct inputs used by the honest party P 1 until the jth execution. Let Γ = {γ 1 1 , . . . , γ t 1 }, for some t ≤ j − 1. If σ j has been incremented since the last execution (this information is passed from S j−1 to S j ), then S j sends to A j the value ε. Otherwise, the simulator invokes the ZK simulator for the language L = {γ ∈ C pk : ∃(x 
S j invokes S 2
cf on input (x j 2 , γ j 1 , pk, −); S 2 cf itself runs A j who controls party P 2 in π 2 f . 12 If S 2 cf sends ⊥, S j sends ⊥ to its trusted party leading to an abort of the execution. Else, S 2 cf sends the continue flag. S j replies (on behalf of the cf-SFE TTP) by sending the empty string to S 2 cf .
6. S j uses the trapdoork to recover x i 1 ←D(k, c i ) and r i 1 ←D(k,c i 1 ) for all i ∈ [t], and lets Λ j−1 = {(x i 1 , r i 1 )} s i=1 for s ∈ N the number of distinct x i 1 's values. Then, the simulator checks whether s + 1 = σ j . If this is the case it sends (−, σ j ) to A j , otherwise, it sends (−, σ j−1 ). Finally, S j outputs whatever A j does.
We need to argue that for all j ∈ [ ] ideal ¦r1−RR f,S(z),2 (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j ≡ c real ¦r1 π f ,A(z),2 (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j .
We consider a series of intermediate hybrid experiments.
Hybrid H 1 A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j : In the first hybrid experiment, we replace S j by S j 1 who controls P 2 in the ideal world. S j 1 is identical to S j , with the only difference that it verifies the state (Γ , Ω , φ ) as P 1 would do in a real execution. Namely, upon input (Γ , Ω , φ ), the simulator computes h = H(γ 1 , . . . , γ t ) and runs V(k, h , φ ). If the verification fails, S j 1 sends ⊥ to A j and halts the simulation; otherwise, it continues the simulation as S j would do. Next, we show that ideal ¦r1−RR f,S(z),2 (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j ≡ c H 1 A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j . In fact, there is a difference in the two hybrid experiments only when the following bad events happen: (i) A j finds a collision in H corresponding to value h ; (ii) A j forges a tag φ for an arbitrary Γ . It is not hard to show that any distinguisher from the two distributions can be turned into an algorithm finding collisions in H or breaking unforgeability of the MAC. Thus, the two hybrids experiments must be computationally close.
Hybrid H 2
A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j : In the second hybrid experiment, we replace S j 1 by S j 2 who controls P 2 in the ideal world and at the same time plays the role of the TTP playing all the roles by itself. As a result, S j 2 directly interacts with P 1 during the ideal execution of the commit-first protocol. Essentially, S j 2 is identical to S j 1 with the exception that it is able to compute and send the correct commitment γ j 1 = C(pk, x j 1 ; r j 1 ) to A j . Also, S j 2 needs to simulate the value σ j by itself. This is done as it would be done in the real protocol, by extracting the inputs in Λ j−1 with the help of the auxiliary keyk and verifying the proof of A j . Finally, note that S 2 cf is now invoked on the correct inputs, i.e., x j 1 and γ j 1 . Everything else is analogous to the previous simulation. Next, we claim that H 1 A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j ≡ c H 2 A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j . 12 We emphasize S 2 cf does not run a new instance of A j but it continues with running the same instance that has been running so far.
A careful inspection shows that the simulation of the value σ j is the same in the two experiments. 13 Given this, the argument is the same used to prove indistinguishability of the second and the third hybrids in the proof of Theorem 5.2 and is therefore omitted.
Hybrid H 3
A(z) (x 1 , x 2 , λ): We modify the previous hybrid world, by having S j 3 provide an actual ZK proof that an input is re-used with respect to the state Σ declared by the server, or to send an empty string ε if this is not case. The zero-knowledge property of the proof system automatically guarantees that the view generated using the real proof and the simulator S ZK are computationally indistinguishable which in turn implies the computational indistinguishability of the output of the current hybrid experiment and the last. Thus, we have H To conclude the proof, it suffices to note that H 3 f,A(z),i (x 1 , x 2 , λ) j exactly equals the output distribution of A j in the real world, thus proving that π f ← Ψ RR (π f , ¦r1, ) is a secure (stateless) rate-revealing ¦r1-limited protocol for function f . Using the protocols in [18] , a proof for L mult requires 15 exponentiations and a proof for L zero requires 8 exponentiations. Given proof systems for the above languages, our proof π ope can be constructed as follows.
Protocol π ope (ZK proof for L ope (n))
• Joint statement: pk and (ĉ, c 1 , . . . , c n )
• Auxiliary inputs for the prover: sk • Execution steps:
13 Strictly speaking, we would need to slightly change the description of the ideal world described in Section 4. In fact, when A j tries to cheat by sending only a subset of the state, it might be that the client will set the ZK proof to ε even though its input is actually non fresh. However, when this happens, the client will perceive a higher rate, without any risk to exceed the value ¦r1. For this reason, we preferred to ignore this technicality in the proof, sticking to the previous definition.
Given appropriate proofs for these languages, one can apply the techniques of [15] , to efficiently construct a proof for any conjunctive and/or disjunctive formula over statements proved in the components. As result, we only need to show proofs for the above two languages.
We first show that in our case, proof of membership in L rate ¦r1 can in fact be reduced to a proof for the language L ope (n), and then describe a proof for the latter. To observe why this is the case, note that in our rate-hiding compiler c i 's are encryptions of 0 and 1. As a result, we compute the following n ciphertexts c i = 1≤j≤i c i , where the sum represent the additive homomorphic operation. It is easy to see that there is an encryption of t among the c i s if and only if there are at least ¦r1 encryptions of 1 among the c i s. As a result, L rate ¦r1 (n) for (pk, c 1 , . . . , c n ) reduces to L ope (n) for (pk, c 1 , . . . , c n ).
It remains to show a proof for L ope (n). The proof strategy is the same as the complement language discussed above until the last step. In the last step, instead of proving that the resulting ciphertext is encryption of 0, we need to prove that it is encryption of a non-zero. While it is possible to show such a statement using "range proof" techniques, we show a direct and more efficient technique for proving this statement for the language L zero = {(pk, c) : ∃r, m = 0 s.t. c = E(pk, m; r)}
The idea is to multiply the underlying plaintext with a random values in the message domain (both parties contribute to the random value to avoid cheating). If the plaintext was a 0, so is the product, but if not, the result is non-zero with high probability. Furthermore, revealing the product does not reveal any information about the original plaintext (hence zero-knowledge).
Protocol π zero (ZK proof for L zero )
• Joint statement: (pk, c)
• Auxiliary inputs for the prover: sk • Execution steps: 1. The prover generates a uniformly random message r p from the message space and sends c p = E(pk, r p ; r) to verifier along with a standard proof of knowledge of message and randomness. 2. Verifier generates a uniformly random message r v from the message space and sends r v , r , c v = E(pk, r v ; r ) to prover. 3. Prover lets c 1 = c v + h c p , and c 2 = E(pk, (r v + r p )m; r ), and runs π mult for the tuple (pk, c, c 1 , c 2 ). Prover also reveals (r v + r p )m and r . 4. Verifiers accepts if (r v + r p )m is non-zero and the ciphertext c 2 generated honestly.
The proof that the above protocol is indeed ZK, follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition D.1, and is therefore omitted.
D.3 DL-based Instantiations
Many other protocols, potentially, allow to obtain efficient ZK proofs to be used in our compilers. For instance, if the underlying commitment scheme of the underlying cf-SFE is a discrete-log based scheme (e.g., Pedersen [50] or ElGamal [23] )-as in the case of the PSI construction of Hazay and Nissim-or it accesses the commitment scheme in a black-box manner (i.e., the construction does not rely on a specific commitment scheme unless the security properties are satisfied), then we can derive a ZK-proof of repeated-input efficiently. Indeed, as stated in [12] , building efficient zero-knowledge proofs for all known discrete-logarithm-based statements is possible (with constant overhead), and several previous works [16, 22, 10, 8, 9] propose techniques for proving statements encoded as discrete logarithms, efficiently. ZK-proofs of repeated-input work for statements in the language L i = {γ ∈ C pk i : ∃(x, r, r ) s.t. γ = C(pk i , x; r) and C(pk i , x; r ) ∈ Γ 3−i }.
Now, if C is, for instance, the Pedersen commitment scheme [50] , then the above language is equivalent to L i = {(x, r, r ) : γ = g x h r ∧ γ = g x h r ∧ γ ∈ Γ 3−i }.
Note that this approach work for basically all commit-first protocols where either the commitment scheme is based on the discrete-logarithm problem or the construction is not restricting the choice of the commitment scheme.
